Table of Contents
Introduction
The South China Sea is one example of how maps can cause disputes between countries. In recent decades, there has been an increase in the disputes between China and its neighbours in this region. China has been using economic, military, and diplomatic methods to advance its geopolitical objectives in the South China Sea. As China opened new research stations in the Subi Reefs and established two administrative districts, the already-existing tensions reached a new low during the pandemic.
The navies of China and the Philippines engaged in face-offs in 2021. Tensions over fishing and navigational rights arose when Indonesia and Vietnam announced their finalised borders in December 2022, with overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims to the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. These claims coincide with China’s nine-dash line. A unified front has been established by the US, Japan, and South Korea against Beijing’s maritime expansionism.
Beijing unveiled the 2023 version of the Ministry of Natural Resources’ standard map of China amid escalating hostilities with the US over Taiwan. Taiwan’s territory and the majority of the West Philippine Sea, including the disputed Spratly Islands, are included in this map.
Within their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Philippines refer to the waters of the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea. The 10-dash line, which represents the entire South China Sea, is also included on the map, along with the EEZs of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
The Communist Party of China’s (CCP) overarching goal is to carry out its intended reunification with Taiwan.
A “maximalist claim to sovereignty and control over all of the features, land, water, and seabed within the area bounded by the nine-dash line,” according to experts, is what the nine-dash line represents
Militarisation Of The South China Sea
The neighbouring quarters strongly objected to and protested against the released map.
Days after China’s coast guard established a cordon to impede supply boats delivering to Manila’s military outpost in Ayungin Shoal in the disputed waters, the map was released in a calculated move.
China’s “alleged sovereignty and jurisdiction over Philippines features and maritime zones has no basis under international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” according to Manila’s official statement. The Philippines also declared that it will patrol South China Sea waters in tandem with Australia and the United States. These joint exercises are primarily intended to restrain China’s expanding influence in the area and the US’s growing interest in a larger South Asian region.
The U-shaped nine-dash line that a Chinese geographer drew on a map in the 1940s serves as the foundation for China’s recent claims to 90% of the South China Sea. The U-shaped ‘nine-dash line’, which the Chinese refer to as the ‘blue national soil’, is the dotted line that was taken from Chinese maps in the 1940s to symbolise Beijing’s claims.
In the South China Sea, China has been stepping up its military presence. By means of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it seeks to increase its footprint in the area.
China launched missiles into the sea to thwart the American warship that was cruising around the islands it had built, and the neighbouring regional powers’ retaliatory actions indicated that the maritime disputes were becoming more militarised.
Why Global Powers Are Interested In South China Sea?
There are “substantial energy deposits” (hydrocarbon resources) in the waters off the Diaoyu region, according to a 1969 report released by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. At this point, the People’s Republic of China started endorsing assertions in retaliation against the security alliance between the United States and Japan.
1972 saw a normalisation of relations between China and Japan, deescalating the tensions over the islands. Following the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam in 1974, the Chinese continue to station thousands of troops in the Paracels Islands to this day.
China-US Military Agreement of 1998 was unsuccessful. A joint energy accord between China and Japan was signed in 2008 with the aim of exploring the gas fields in the East China Sea. However, the accord has not been successful because of Japan’s accusations that China developed the Kashi field unilaterally.
Tensions in the region flared up again in May 2009 when Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted a request to the UN Commission to extend their continental shelf beyond the conventional 200 nautical miles. The Exclusive Economic Zones have overlapping claims, which have been a major source of conflict and instability in the area.
China would be able to establish military bases and impose trade blockades in the event of a future conflict if it were to control this region. It would also be able to monopolise tanker shipments along the strategic trade routes in the East and South China Sea.
Additionally, this would serve as a buffer zone on the mainland of Southern China. The United States’ interest in the South China Sea and the larger Asia-Pacific region was reaffirmed during the 2010 U.S.-Asean Ministerial meeting and the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.
China contested Japan’s status quo in 2012 by asserting its claims over the territorial sea baselines and stepping up its patrols in response to Japan’s nationalisation of the Diaoyu Islands. The People’s Republic of China (PLA) has boosted its military budget in order to strengthen its maritime power and deterrence capabilities.
To strengthen their position in the area, they have created forces such as the Maritime Safety Administration and the Chinese Maritime Police.
China has used its trade connections, or “economic leverage,” as a useful tool in its foreign policy with regard to ASEAN relations. Additionally, it has conducted exploration work in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam. The US’s foreign policy clearly reflects its Asia Rebalancing strategy. The United States’ Joint Operational Access concept is countered by the Chinese Anti-Access and Area Denial capabilities.
Historic Rights Over The 11-Dash Line
Since the South China Sea was discovered during China’s Han Dynasty, the country has used historical justification to support its claims to the region. China further contends that the South China Sea lies inside its borders, citing a Chinese expedition to Cambodia in the third century CE A.D. and official and unofficial reports from the Song and Yuan dynasties.
The official maps created by the Chinese Kuomintang Nationalist Party are where the nine-dash line originated, according to US scholar Robert D. Kalpan’s book Asia’s Cauldron.
Regarding the chronology of historical events, the Kuomingtang-led government repeatedly claimed these islands after the Japanese invaded the South China Sea Islands in 1937 and the United States subsequently took control of the Diaoyu Islands in 1945 as communism spread throughout the region.
Initially, an eleven-dash line on a map marked China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea during the nationalist Kuomingtang party’s rule. The bulk of the region, which was reclaimed from Japan after World War II, is covered by this claim, which also includes the Macclesfield Bank, the Pratas Islands, and the Paracel and Spartly Islands.
As time goes on, they escaped to Taiwan following the overthrow of the Kuomintang government. As a result, the South China Sea is currently formally claimed by Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.
Chinese geographer Yang Huarein originally drew an 11-dash line, which is now known as the nine-dash line. The South China Sea Islands were designated as 286 sections of reef and rock when the 11-dash line was established in 1947.
With the evolving relationship with Taiwan and rising tensions with the United States and its neighbours, the line has seen numerous changes and shifts throughout history.
The Diaoyu Islands’ transfer to Taiwan was not made clear in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco between the United States and Japan, and this is still a hotly contested topic in the ongoing discussion over East China Sea sovereignty.
The 11-dash line became the nine-dash line in 1952 when Mao Zedong’s China gave up its claims to the Gulf of Tonkin. At that time, Vietnam and China had friendly relations. The 11-dash line had two dashes removed in 1953 when Vietnam acquired the territorial title to Bach Long Vi Island from China. China and Vietnam border the Gulf of Tonkin, which is where the first two lines are located.
Both states shared a three-mile territorial sea and were politically close at the time of the 1950s nine-dash line.
These lines delineate the median line between the larger landmasses encircling the littorals of the South China Sea and the islands within it, according to both China and Taiwan. This changed once more in 2009 when China and Vietnam started to have problems. China sent the UN a map that showed the nine-dash line mentioned in the documents. In summary, the CCP still bases its claims on the 1953 nine-dash line.
But there are a number of reasons why the historical rights theory has been refuted. First off, there is insufficient proof to support China’s claim to have ruled the South China Sea since the middle of the 17th century. According to writer and historian Robert D. Kalpan, these islands and land features in the South China Sea are minuscule fragments of the planet devoid of any sign of life.
The Legality Of The Chinese Claims Under International Laws
The UNCLOS laws do not address the Chinese argument of historic right or historic waters. It is true that the legality of the nine-dash line is highly debatable and unclear.
As per the United States Department of States, a historical claim could pertain to either sovereignty or a subordinate set of rights over the maritime space. The historic bay is defined in UNCLOS Article 10(6), but no definition of the term is given.
Observing the dynamics of domestic legislations taking precedence over international laws is also fascinating. China passed a law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in June 1998. This law supported the PRC’s historical rights, which are subject to debate, and was consistent with its strategy of staking out a legitimate position for itself in the South China Sea along the so-called “nine-dash line.”
China’s unquestionable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands, Parcel Islands, Zhongsha Islands, Nansha Islands, and surrounding waters was reaffirmed in a position paper the Chinese government released in 2014 regarding jurisdiction in the South China Sea Islands.
The legal interpretation of the nine-dash lines has taken many forms. One of these interpretations views the line as denoting the boundaries of China’s sovereignty, both historically and traditionally, but it does not adequately specify China’s claims over these maritime areas.
In the event of disputes in this region, the nation has always prioritised the development of bilateral negotiations over multilateral ones.
All uses of the oceans are governed by the legal framework and principles established by the UNCLOS, and issues pertaining to international waters are subject to the guidelines and norms of general international law.
Furthermore, it specifies the limitations and EEZ or continental shelf conditions for the islands. China makes unfounded claims in this framework. Not to mention, every state that borders the South China Sea has ratified UNCLOS, including the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Darussalam.
Chinese counterclaim: the UNCLOS does not apply to the nine-dash line on the lines of non-retroactivity because the previous law came into effect in 1994, 47 years after the Chinese government submitted the official nine-dash line.
Under the UNCLOS Code of Conduct and Dispute Settlement Regime, however, this argument is invalid. Regarding the disputes referred to in Article 298 of the Convention, including those involving historic bays or disputes involving sea boundary limitation, the Chinese government does not accept any of the procedures outlined in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention.
The outcome of the diplomatic negotiations aimed at improving the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of the States involved in the South China Sea will determine the future of the problematic waters in the region. The South and East China Sea sovereignty disputes are not expressly covered by the UNCLOS.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague determined in 2013 that the legal foundation for the Chinese nine-dash line claims is nonexistent. The court determined that China’s land reclamation programme is the reason behind the land requirements under UNCLOS for creating an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles.
It also made clear that Beijing’s efforts to construct islands had an impact on the marine environment. It is still not binding to implement the 2017 proposed draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text. At least for the foreseeable future, China’s hegemony in the ASEAN has prevented any meaningful legislation from resolving the problem. In conclusion, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have not been satisfactorily resolved by international law.
