The Indo-Pacific region is at risk of bipolarity as the tensions between the US and China escalate and the therefore emergence of new poles in international relations of the region is impulsive. The anxieties driven by China’s economic diplomacy and militarisation induced search for multilateral solutions to the ensuing problems. ASEAN has projected itself as a prominent pole in drafting regional economic and security architecture. The group’s stature as a premium strategic forum is challenged by the advent of Quad 2.0 which ropes in four gigantic countries into the fold of strategic planning for the Indo-Pacific. As ASEAN lead mechanisms have achieved less in terms of the security structure, Quad is welcomed as a strategic inevitability which threatens the idea of ASEAN Centrality!
Initially raised as a bulwark against communism, ASEAN is the only Cold War institution to survive in South-east Asia. Plagued by the power politics in post Cold War times ensuing from the US-China rivalry, the ASEAN charter signed in 2007 prescribed for ASEAN Centrality, the institution to play a central role in developing a regional architecture for the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN Community envisions the Indo-Pacific as a region free from great power rivalry and hegemonic competition and respect for sovereignty of the small powers. ASEAN value, which stresses the importance of dialogues and deliberations to reach consensus, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which calls for the settlement of disputes through peaceful means and prohibits the use or threat of force to resolve conflicts.
ASEAN’s vision of Indo-Pacific
The ASEAN constituent states have failed to form consensus on the role of Quad as a regional security grouping. The countries like Vietnam and Philippines are receptive to the Quad as they face territorial aggression from China while Indonesia is sceptical about Quad strengthening role in the Indo-Pacific, given its perception of leadership in the ASEAN. Small kingdoms like Laos and Cambodia are integrated with Chinese and thus are less Quad friendly in their outlook . As ‘China threat’ is the raison d’être of the QUAD, for most southeast Asian countries China may not be an overarching enemy rather a source of economic progress for their country. For most Southeast countries China’s BRI would draw in more resources and development than the vague idea of ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’
QUAD’s birth and the ASEAN Centrality
The diluting presence of the United States from Asia at the turn of the 21st century and a rising China in its neighbourhood prompted the Japanese to spearhead the Quad. The Quad members India, Japan and Australia are committed to ensuring an inclusive, free and open Indo-Pacific region while the US’ National Security Strategy explicitly refers to the containment of China as one of the policy goals in its Indo-Pacific strategy branding the country as a ‘revisionist power’. Given the strategic heft of the member states, Quad should not be seen as a strategic rival to ASEAN. Given the lack of a coherent Southeast Asian picture of the Quad, the imperative question is, are the members motivated to spend energy and resources beyond the ASEAN initiated mechanism of ARF, EAS etc.
QUAD vs ASEAN: Competing Visions
QUAD and ASEAN are perceived to assume divergent strategic roles in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad possesses much more material capabilities and diplomatic clout than ASEAN. The four member grouping aims to infuse internationally accepted rules and norms but ASEAN states might be reluctant to embrace the western backed rules-based order for the region. If the Quad begins to play a dominant institutional role in the region, the ASEAN Centrality would be marginalised. Quad’s value based diplomacy which is hinged upon continuous advocacy for extending liberal rules and norms would further alienate the Southeast Asian nations that have little respect for democracy and human rights.
