Table of Contents
Introduction to Hydro-Diplomacy
The Latin word “Rivalis”, which meaning “relationship between two persons using the same stream of river,” is where the word “rival” gets its etymology. Unlike oil, rivers are transboundary resources with no single point of access. As a result, no nation-state can assert total sovereignty over a river and its path. But the resources that are already available are being taxed more heavily by South Asia’s growing population, and river water is no exception.
Challenges in Transboundary River Management
In a multipolar world, the increasing economic interdependence among the countries forces them to employ diplomacy and discourse as a means of resolving disputes. The term “hydro diplomacy” describes diplomatic initiatives taken by riparian states to address problems pertaining to their shared water resources.
These are states with varying elevations that are under the same river flow. Negotiations are conducted between nations through Hydro Diplomacy to guarantee just and equal access to shared water resources. This may entail collaboration on water management, sharing of hydrological data, and institutionalising procedures for resolving disputes.
Significant rivers in South Asia, including the Indus, Brahmaputra, and Mekong, traverse numerous national borders, resulting in intricate disagreements regarding water access and permissible use.
These disputes are complicated by the river’s origin and sovereignty claims over its course. The source of all major river systems in South Asia is the Tibetan Autonomous Region, sometimes known as the “Water Tower of Asia”. China does, however, control the area.
The Role of China in South Asia’s River Systems
Because of its large flow and larger catchment area, the Brahmaputra River, which rises in Tibet and flows through Northeast India and Bangladesh, is a significant source of irrigation and hydropower generation in the area. Concerns regarding the ecological effects on downstream areas have been raised by China’s plans to construct a number of dams as big as the majestic Three Gorges Dam on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra within its borders in the upcoming years.
Apart from that, China has already constructed three run-of-the-river dams for the purpose of producing hydroelectricity at regular intervals without first contacting the lower riparian state. This affects the northeastern states of India more ecologically.
Economic and Environmental Implications
Since ancient times, South Asia has been a major exporter of food crops that depend on these rivers for irrigation. Data from the World Integrated Trade Solution indicates that Bangladesh and India account for 18% of raw food material exports.
The Indo-China peninsula countries rely heavily on the Mekong River for irrigation, agriculture, and hydroelectric power. The river is shared by six countries in Southeast Asia. Additionally, the peninsula exports a significant amount of agricultural goods, particularly coffee from Vietnam, which is the second-largest exporter in the world.
Due to China’s construction of hydropower dams in the upper Mekong Delta region—including the Jinghon Dam in the neighbouring countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar—downstream nations have accused China of causing greater environmental concerns and of drying out the region.
Regional Initiatives
Since China has upper riparian access to the river in the region, India has been diplomatically assertive with China on water management issues, sometimes even at the expense of confrontation that has resulted in China’s unilateral actions that are detrimental to the ecology (floods and upstream pollution) of low-lying areas.
These dams’ artificial flood control systems have the potential to cause flooding in India’s northeastern states, where the only defence available is preventive diplomacy, which also fails in times of conflict. Under the pretext of a technical glitch, China refused to share hydrological data of the Brahmaputra river with India during the 2017 Doklam standoff, despite China having shared the same data with Bangladesh. This was in accordance with the 2002 agreement for which India pays $183,532 annually.
Institutionalizing Hydro Diplomacy through Multilateralism
The United Nations Water Conventions (UNWC) and the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (NNUIW) are currently the two pieces of international law that are considered to be the international law for international river water sharing because they have at least some level of acceptance in the international community. NNUIW has 38 ratifiers, compared to 35 for UNWC.
In addition, there have been attempts to establish regional agreements, such as The South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), which was introduced by the World Bank in 2008 and is solely concerned with resolving disputes over territorial water sharing in the water systems of the Himalayan rivers. SAWI was shut down in 2021 as a result of its failure to foster agreement among the region’s member countries.
India’s Diplomatic Approach
The main problem with the Himalayan river water system is the general lack of trust among the participating countries. India can take the lead in these negotiations by offering positive-sum solutions that can be institutionalised in the future. This is a lengthy process that will require dexterity and political will on the part of India, but most importantly, South Asian partners must be willing to share the political burden of not cooperating effectively, which is a heavy burden that Indian diplomacy needs to be prepared to lift if it hopes to become a regional power.
Treaties for the sharing of the Mahakali River with Nepal and the Ganga (Padma) and Kushiyara Rivers with Bangladesh have been successfully negotiated by India. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has also been upheld by Pakistan and India.
Despite all the political and security unrest between India and Pakistan, the IWT has persevered, demonstrating the viability of hydro-diplomacy in the area. India has initiated a cruise ship service on the Ganga River, which flows from Bangladesh into the northeastern states of India.
The first low-hanging fruit that India can harvest could be to combine all of these initiatives and streamline all of these countries under a single multilateral organisation. The development of measures aimed at fostering confidence that are exclusively focused on river water sharing, water pollution mitigation in accordance with the Sixth Sustainable Development Goal, and the navigational use of these rivers for trade and commerce within the South Asian region can be the next step.
Such actions could contribute to the development of a multilateral forum that is primarily focused on cooperation in the river systems of South Asia, which could be the driving force behind hydrodiplomacy in the region.
India can use its position as a geographical mid-riparian state and aspirational great power to unite nations that share tributaries under the auspices of this innovative institution, which can foster collaboration and cooperative management of shared water resources. This could be advantageous to India and support rule-based, inclusive regional development and stability for all participating countries.
